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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Negotiations Go On	
(Information as of 2300 EDT)	
Lebanon remained calm yesterday as negotiations between the PLO and the Lebanese Government continue.	
In their discussions with the Lebanese, the Palestinians seem generally reconciled to leaving Beirut. They are posing conditions, however, designed to ensure both their personal safety and an ability to claim they extracted concessions.	
Comment: The Palestinians' demands apparently still include an Israeli pullback from Beirut, the right to keep some arms, and international quarantees for their safety as they depart.	l
Israeli Military Activity	
Israeli units may have advanced to the town of Qibbay on the road from Bhamdun to Hammana, but the Israelis are not engaging Syrian forces in Hammana. any fighting in the area probably is between the Phalangists and the Syrians.//	
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25X1	//The Israelis also claim large amounts of military equipment and supplies belonging to the PLO have been captured in Lebanon. 60 to 80 flatbed trailer truckloads of	
	PLO "war supplies" are being transported daily back to Israel.//	25X
25X1	400 to 500 tanks, including 10 Soviet-built T-72s, have been captured by the Israelis in Lebanon. The Israelis continue to maintain they have not captured any T-72s.//	25X
	Syrian Military Developments	
25X1	a brigade of Syrian regulars reinforced by the troops who escaped from Alayh last week remains in the Ras al Matn area north of the Beirut-Damascus highway. An artillery battery also is in the area. There do not appear to be any changes in the Syrian deployments in the Bekaa Valley.//	25X
	//Syria last week deployed a battery of its SA-8 surface-to-air missiles, possibly for the first time.	25X
	//The morale of Syrian troops in Lebanon reportedly has deteriorated. Many soldiers are blaming President Assad for sacrificing them needlessly.//	25X
25 X 1	troops retreating from Alayh and Bhamdun last week cursed Assad for sacrificing them in order to get Arab support and money. The air and air defense forces also were denounced for failing to provide air cover.//	25X 25X

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USSR-JORDAN: Brezhnev's failure to keep a scheduled meeting with Jordan's King Hussein, who departed Moscow yesterday after a brief "unofficial" visit, reinforces other evidence that the Soviet leader is playing a less active role in foreign policy. Comment: Brezhnev may be physically indisposed, as has been the case on other rare occasions when he did not meet a visiting head of state.
The temporary setback to Brezhnev's health this spring and ensuing political problems apparently have reduced his capacity for leadership. He continues to
make speeches, express policy lines, and preside over important meetings. His schedule, however, is subject to the vagaries of his health, and the extent of his participation in policy formulation is increasingly in doubt.
With efficient staffwork and other Politburo members taking up the slack, the system can function effectively for now with a weakened chief. If Brezhnev's condition does not improve, however, he could become more vulnerable

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to pressure to retire or be forced into a figurehead

role.

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EL SALVADOR - HONDURAS: New Military Cooperation //The Salvadoran and Honduran armed forces have begun a com- bined operation against insurgent forces in northern Morazan.//	25X [°]
//Salvadoran forces, following their recapture of Perquin and San Fernando, will try to clear out guerrilla base camps north of the towns. The Hondurans have deployed two battalions to the area to block the insurgents' escape, and they then plan to join the sweep operation from their side of the border. The guerrillas, however, already appear to have fled.//	25X
//Meanwhile, the insurgents have increased their harassing attacks on buses and other commercial vehicles throughout the country. They also have begun new raids on several small government garrisons.//	25X ⁻
Comment: //The new Honduran Commander in Chief, General Alvarez, appears more willing than his predecessor to commit Honduran forces against the Salvadoran insur- gents. If such cooperation continues, it will make the guerrillas' use of the border area much less secure as a base of operation.//	25 X

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USSR: Global Radionavigation Satellite System
The Soviets recently announced their intention to operate a satellite systemGLONASSfor worldwide aircraft radionavigation, which would be similar to the US NAVSTAR/Global Positioning System.
The Soviet system will have three or four satellites in each of three orbital planes. Users will be able to fix their positions by passively determining their distance to each of three satellites. Although the system reportedly was to be in use in May, no satellites for it have been launched.
Comment: When the system is fully operational, it should give the Soviets their own global, two-dimensional, nearly continuous aircraft navigation system. Altitude generally cannot be determined using only three satellites.
The system could be used to position aircraft world-wide for more efficient weapon system delivery. Although the Soviets have not announced any other users for the system, it may be used by land and maritime mobile users and possibly directly by weapon systems.
The Soviets eventually may expand the system to permit access to four satellites. This would provide three-dimensional navigation.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
IRAN: Political Outlook	25X1
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The control of the clerical regime in Tehran has been strengthened by the victory over Iraq. Although the clergy is still subject to factional disputes, no other segment of society can challenge its power. As a result, the broad lines of Iranian policy probably are set for a considerable period.	25X1
The chief power brokers include President Khamenei and Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic Party, and such laymen as Prime Minister Musavi. Ayatollah Meshkini, a leader of theological activists in Qom, and Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, an independent, also play prominent political roles.	25X1
These current leaders are likely to remain in control after Ayatollah Khomeini is gone. Although Khomeini apparently favors Ayatollah Montazeri as his successor, Montazeri lacks Khomeini's religious credentials and forceful personality. If Montazeri does succeed Khomeini, his authority probably will be nominal.	25X1
Domestic Program	
The regime is firm on its course of creating an Islamic society. Islamic justice, with its swift and public punishment, will be meted out as Western values are eradicated. Schools with an "Islamified" curriculum will be established, but engineering, science and medicine will be emphasized to decrease the need for foreign expertise.	25 X 1
Although the Army is now officially part of the Islamic Republic, its loyalty is still suspect. The regime has infiltrated extensive networks of loyalists within the ranks to monitor any possible dissent.	25X1
The regime believes its military needs are modest. For new equipment, Iran will cultivate several foreign sources to avoid dependence on any one.	25X1
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Iran also will pursue an economic strategy more in line with its image as a Third World nation. The late Shah's development schemes will not be resumed on his grandiose scale. Priority will be shifted to agriculture and self-sufficiency in basic industries.	25 ×
Property ownership will be reordered and foreign trade laws altered to end the influence of the traditional elites. A major effort will be devoted to improving the lot of the poorthe regime's power baseand to reducing the rural exodus to the cities.	25X
Foreign Policy	
The regime's foreign policy is conditioned by its hostility toward and fear of the US. This colors relations with the West generally and most directly affects US interests in the Persian Gulf region.	25X
The government's priority aim is to replace President Saddam Hussein and his secular Ba'thist regime in Iraq. Tehran also will use subversion, threats, diplomacy and possibly military action to turn Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf area away from the West and toward accommodation with Iran.	25 ×
More broadly, the regime sees its foreign policy as in accord with the objectives of the more radical members of the nonaligned movement. Iran has sought political association with Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLOthe Arab "Steadfastness Front." It has seized on the invasion of Lebanon to demonstrate its opposition to Israel and has committed some troops to the fight.	25X
In expanding its economic relations, however, Iran has focused on Pakistan, Turkey and India. All have substantial Muslim populations.	25 X
The association with radical Arab states and the hostility to the US jibe with Soviet interests. But bilateral ties with the USSR continue to be limited by the clerics' suspicion of Moscow and their opposition to Communism. In addition, there are substantial differences over such specific issues as Afghanistan and Soviet military aid to Iraq.	25)
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//Western interest in Iran as a barrier to Soviet expansion and as a source of oil argues for closer political and economic ties. If the Arab states in the Persian Gulf believe the West is courting Iran, however, their own sense of insecurity and isolation will grow. Aid to the Persian Gulf states at Iran's expense, on the other hand, may spur Tehran's efforts to replace these regimes with ones more Islamic.//	25 X 1
//In any event, the clerical regime will not resume normal relations with the US for the foreseeable future. Expanded ties with Western Europe are possible, but any moves in that direction will not reduce Iran's hostility	ţ
to Western interests in the Persian Gulf.//	25X1

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